

Reflections on Metropolitan Manila Reorganization and Social Change

MANUEL A. CAOILI*

The problems that confront the Metropolitan Manila Area (MMA) at present are a product of contradictions arising from the colonial status of Philippine society during the Spanish and American periods, and a dependent development policy which was continued during the postwar period. Contending political and social forces at the national level aggravated these problems, but at the same time strengthened Manila's position as the primate city through the economic surplus extracted from the rural areas. With the declaration of martial law in 1972, metropolitan reorganization to improve service delivery became possible. However, these reforms have to be examined if they have been achieved at the expense of the other regions. A strong political will and a committed leadership are needed to sustain MMA's reform policies while regulating Manila's primacy and urban growth vis-a-vis a more balanced progress in the countryside.

Introduction

The question of metropolitan reorganization is traditionally viewed in terms of solving the technical and administrative problems of service delivery—i.e. economy and efficiency in the provision of public housing, mass transport, police, fire protection, health and sanitation, water supply and sewerage, garbage collection and others—in a large urban area which is generally under the jurisdiction of several local authorities. Yet in the case of Metropolitan Manila, and presumably in similar Third World cities, metropolitan reorganization cannot be isolated from the broader problems of national development and politics. The pattern of urbanization in the Philippines, its socioeconomic structure, national and local political dynamics are the products of its colonial history and continuing dependent development. Manila, as the direct link between the Philippines and its colonial rulers, developed into the country's dominant urban center. Manila's problems as a primate city¹—political, administrative and socioeconomic, the recent reorganization of its government and prospects for further reform—must therefore be examined in the context of Philippine history, present national policies and external factors which impinge on these policies.

*Associate Professor and Director, Administrative Development Center, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.

Philippine Dependent Development

Spanish, and later, American colonial policies nurtured Manila's urbanization, shaped Philippine economic development, social class formation and politics. The economy developed largely as supplier for European and American markets of agricultural products and raw materials which were exported mainly from the port of Manila, and as importer of British and American manufactured goods.² As a consequence of this pattern of surplus extraction, economic prosperity was for a long time largely confined to Manila and adjoining areas and, later, in a few other port cities. Much of the countryside remained economically stagnant.

Social class formation was determined by the change in the traditional land tenure system from communal ownership and land use based on usufruct rights to land ownership as private property. This resulted in the alienation of landholdings of peasants and gave rise to landlords, lessors, small farmers, sharecroppers, and landless laborers. Economic and political power became concentrated in a small landowning class, largely composed of the descendants of the pre-Spanish rulers (*principalia*) the religious orders, and the Spanish and Chinese *mestizos*.³ The *principalia* were made local government functionaries by the Spanish colonial authorities. The educated members of this elite group, the *ilustrados*, articulated popular demands for political and economic reforms by Spain during the latter half of the nineteenth century and eventually provided the later leadership of the 1896 Philippine Revolution.⁴ But factional divisions among the *ilustrados* and the arrival of the Americans in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War in 1898 negated the survival of the first Philippine Republic.

Like the Spaniards before them, the Americans co-opted the landed, educated elite into the colonial government. The latter acted as brokers between the colonial authorities and the Filipino masses. Through their network of patron-client relations, the landed elite dominated colonial politics and, despite their nationalist, populist rhetoric developed a vested interest in the continuation of Philippine special relations with the United States even after the attainment of political independence. Thus the objective of redressing social inequality through agrarian and other reforms remained largely ignored in colonial policy-making.⁵

The concentration of political and economic power in the traditional elite and the pervasiveness of clientelist, particularistic politics fostered the continuing dependent development of Philippine economy and society after independence in 1946. This type of development resulted from significant control by the United States government over the direction of Philippine postwar economic reconstruction and development, American influence over the Filipino elite and national politics, and the continuing presence of U.S. military bases in the archipelago.⁶ The extension of preferential trade rela-

tions between the United States and the Philippines beyond 1946 and the former's payment of war damage to the latter was made contingent, among others, on the grant of parity rights to American citizens in the exploitation and development of Philippine natural resources. Acquiescence to this condition necessitated the amendment of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, made possible by the adroit political maneuvering of the Roxas (Liberal Party) administration, resulting in the expulsion from the defunct Philippine Congress of elected members of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and some Nacionalista Party members who were opposed to the parity amendment.⁷

The expulsion of the DA from the legislature had profound implications for subsequent Philippine political and socioeconomic development. It deprived labor, peasant, socialist and nationalist groups, and the Communist Party of legitimate representation in national policy-making. Many members of these groups were thus driven underground, inflaming the long-simmering social unrest that had its roots in the 1896 Revolution. Pressures from the United States government for support of its Cold War policies by the Filipino elite nurtured the latter's paranoia towards even non-Communist radical reformers as subversives. This explains the Philippine government's repression of DA supporters and other radical groups which subsequently resulted in the Communist-led peasant rebellion in Central Luzon.

The rebellion was to effectively divert much-needed government resources for postwar rehabilitation and economic development into a prolonged and costly military campaign which lasted until 1956. The resulting instability also brought deeper United States involvement in Philippine affairs. This came in the form of increased military aid—American equipment and advisers to the Philippine armed forces, the use of American bases in the campaign against the Huks—and the assignment of resident American advisers in key Philippine government institutions to monitor and direct U.S. economic assistance.⁸

The exclusion of the DA from legitimate political activity had yet another long-term consequence. It maintained the hegemony and homogeneity of the traditional elite in national politics and obviated the development of program-oriented, mass-based political parties. The clientelist basis and personality-orientation of political parties continued to pervade the electoral and policy-making process.⁹ The narrow class interest and dominance of the traditional landed elite frustrated the adoption of such basic policies as agrarian reform, modernization and diversification of the economy to meet rising popular expectations for employment and better living standards.

The period of foreign exchange and import controls from 1949 to 1962 provided an opportunity for nationalist entrepreneurs to push for the protection of Philippine manufacturing enterprises. Nevertheless, the industries that developed during that time were dependent on imports of capital goods

and raw materials and involved mainly packaging, assembly and light manufactures. Moreover, the direct involvement of American advisers in the allocation by the Philippine Central Bank of import licenses and foreign exchange permits greatly favored well-capitalized American and Chinese firms.¹⁰ Thus when controls were lifted in 1962, in response to pressures from the traditional elite and American business interest groups, many Filipino firms were unable to survive foreign competition.

Dependent Philippine development was manifested in the concentration of industries and economic activities in the Metropolitan Manila Area (MMA), the continuing emphasis on agricultural production for export, and rural underdevelopment. There was a widening gap in income distribution and living standards between the elite and the masses, between rural and urban areas, and among geographic regions. At the same time, rapid population growth, rising literacy levels and the spread of modern media of communications fueled rising mass expectations for socioeconomic advancement. Perceptions of better job opportunities in urban areas, particularly in Manila, coupled with rural unrest and underdevelopment, resulted in the acceleration of rural to urban migration in the postwar years. This had serious repercussions for local governments especially in MMA where most of the rural migrants went. The influx of rural migrants exacerbated problems of urban congestion such as poor housing conditions, inadequate water supply, health and sanitation difficulties, public transport and traffic management. As majority of these migrants came from the lower income classes, the capacity of MMA local governments to provide basic services such as education, health and welfare, police and fire protection was thus severely strained.¹¹

In summary, despite its political independence, the Philippines continued to be heavily influenced in its postwar development by the United States. This was made possible through direct United States government intervention in Philippine economic and trade policies and through the harmony of interests between the dominant traditional Filipino elite and American economic interest groups. This development strategy has had serious consequences for Philippine social and economic structures and politics.

Dependent Development and Manila's Primacy

Manila's primacy and its attendant problems are the cumulative consequences of its historic role as colonial capital, religious, trade and educational center; and continuing Philippine underdevelopment. Manila's initial growth and prosperity were supported by the profitable Galleon trade and tributes collected from other parts of the country to support the colonial bureaucracy and religious orders based in the city. Urbanization during the period was, to a large extent, due to in-migration from the rural areas, which remained economically stagnant during the first two centuries of Spanish rule, while the city of Manila prospered. Rural dwellers were impelled to

migrate to Manila to avoid the onerous burden of the tribute tax, compulsory labor service (popularly known as *polos y servicios*) and the forced government purchase of agricultural products (otherwise called *bandala*).¹² Manila's expanding population stimulated agricultural production and industry around the city.

Colonial policies designed to promote economic development in the Philippines during the second half of the eighteenth century paved the way for the opening of Manila and other ports to world trade during the nineteenth century. International commerce brought in foreign capital which spurred expansion of agricultural production for export. The increasing profitability of large-scale production of cash crops eventually resulted in the concentration of landownership among the few, alienation of peasant landholdings and the transformation of the peasantry into small farmers, sharecroppers and landless laborers. Many of the dispossessed peasants drifted to Manila and its suburbs in search of employment, thus accelerating the urbanization process in the area.¹³

The concentration of commerce and industry and increased activities of foreign merchants in Manila provided employment for native Filipinos as commercial agents and brokers. This gave rise to a small Filipino middle class. The prosperity resulting from expanding Philippine trade with the outside world likewise enhanced Manila's position as the country's educational and communications center and contributed to further unification and centralization of the archipelago. Manila's added role as financial and cosmopolitan center during the latter half of the nineteenth century completed the outlines of its future growth as a primate city.

As the colonial capital and primate city, Manila fostered the development of Philippine nationalism. The prosperity resulting from world commerce brought increasing numbers of the Filipino elite and masses into social contacts with colonial authorities in Manila. Foreign competition also led to the destruction of traditional textile and other industries in Manila and surrounding areas, causing widespread economic dislocation and suffering among the lower classes. Mass unrest was exacerbated by growing abuses of colonial and religious authorities, particularly in the administration of the latter's agricultural estates. The educated elite, i.e. *ilustrados*, in Manila articulated popular discontent and pressed for colonial reforms. The failure of Spanish authorities to institute reforms and the increasing repression of nationalist leaders nurtured the development of a secret working class-based separatist organization in Manila, the *Katipunan*.¹⁴ The *Katipunan's* membership and activities gradually spread to other provinces, leading to the Revolution of 1898 which overthrew Spanish rule. The Manila elite later played a prominent role in the Revolution and the establishment of the short-lived Philippine Republic. But the arrival of the Americans in Manila in 1898 ushered in another era in Philippine colonial history.

American colonial rule furthered the dependent development of Philippine economy and society. As with centuries of Spanish rule, the countryside was economically exploited to support the colonial bureaucracy in Manila. Manila's growth as a primate city was sustained by its continuing central role in the economy, the introduction of modern amenities by American colonial authorities, improvements in health and sanitation and attempts at planned urban development.¹⁵

Politics during the American regime reflected the cleavages between upper class, agrarian and labor groups and between the urban and rural population. This was especially evident in Manila where the colonial and Filipino elite resided and where an urban working class had developed as a consequence of the growth of manufacturing and commercial enterprises in the city and its suburbs. Manila thus became the center of opposition parties, some of them radical, which tried to get support from among the unrepresented groups.¹⁶ Social unrest was evident in Manila as vicissitudes in the capitalist world market directly affected the working classes. This was aggravated by the continuing influx of migrants from other parts of the country. Rapid urbanization exacerbated Manila's problems of poverty, housing and slum dwelling. The colonial authorities attempted to tackle these problems but their efforts ultimately failed as they did not address the root cause of Manila's continuing primacy, i.e. the country's uneven development and glaring social inequality.

The destruction of much of the city of Manila during World War II, the rapid in-migration during the postwar years, lack of government resources and inability to adopt an urban policy, resulted in the haphazard reconstruction of Manila. Postwar Philippine economic policy perpetuated rural underdevelopment and further concentration of wealth and economic activities in Manila and its surrounding area. Industrialization policies during the era of controls promoted Manila's growth as primate city. As Manila was (and still is) the country's principal port and financial and commercial center, most the new industries were set up in the city and its suburbs. These economic opportunities attracted more rural migrants to the metropolitan area.

A concrete manifestation of the social, economic, administrative and political problems in MMA at present is the proliferation of slum and squatter settlements and the destitution of a large part of the urban population in contrast to the relatively few middle and upper class residents living in modern subdivisions and exclusive villages. This glaring social inequality is reflected in the highly uneven distribution of financial resources among the local units, resulting in large disparities in the availability and quality of public services. For example, in fiscal year 1974-75, per capita revenue among MMA units ranged from ₱16 in Pateros to ₱223 in Manila. Per capita

expenditures during the same year varied from ₱19 in Pateros to ₱243 in Makati. In calendar year 1980, per capita revenue among MMA units ranged from ₱34 in Pateros to ₱412 in Makati. Per capita expenditures during the same year varied from ₱28 in Pateros to ₱351 in Makati.¹⁸

As Manila is the seat of the national government, the Philippine elite has generally lived in MMA. However, political support for the elite was essentially rural-based, made possible through clientelist ties between national and local elites, and between the latter and the masses. This explains the preoccupation in the Congress with legislation granting local autonomy and other local bills (to get rural elite support), the lack of agrarian reform policy, weak support for national economic development plans, absence of urban land reform and urban policy, and resistance to the reform of MMA.

The failure to deal with the problems of MMA from 1946 to 1972 can be explained further by other political forces at work in the Philippines. The separation of powers between Congress and President and the socioeconomic bases of political power shaped the functioning of the political process. Party politics, built on particularistic, clientelist relations rather than common ideology or program of government, focused on pragmatic and short term political bargaining between the President and Congress and this determined policy-making.

In the MMA, party politics similarly pervaded the functioning of city and municipal governments. These underlay mayor-council conflicts which tended to cripple local administration, thus adversely affecting the delivery of services. Middle class reform groups failed in their efforts to tackle problems of urban government as they did not seriously attempt to mobilize lower class support.¹⁹ There were jurisdictional disputes over responsibility for the delivery of services among local units which immobilized local bureaucracies to the detriment of the urban population. Solutions to MMA's problems were piecemeal and uncoordinated.

As it became more obvious that MMA's problems had transcended local boundaries, there were attempts to cope with these through various voluntary *ad hoc* and other arrangements among local governments.²⁰ However, these generally proved unworkable. It was evident that an integrated solution to Metropolitan Manila's deteriorating conditions required intervention by the national government. But intra-elite competition for electoral support and clientelist ties between central government and MMA local officials precluded consideration of drastic metropolitan reform by Congress.

To recapitulate, Manila's historic roles as colonial capital, religious, trade, educational and cultural center conditioned its growth as a primate city. Manila's development has been sustained by the economic surplus ex-

tracted from its hinterland. This situation has resulted in continuous streams of urban in-migration as the population was simultaneously "pushed" from the rural areas by the lack of development there and "pulled" to the city by the prospects of improved living conditions. Over the centuries the MMA has thus disproportionately grown, becoming the Philippines' primate city. The continuing dependent development of postwar Philippine economy and society has strengthened MMA's position as the dominant urban center.

Metropolitan Reorganization: Form and Substance

The accumulating contradictions that resulted from the country's underdevelopment—increasing social inequality, concentration of political and economic power in the traditional landed elite, clientelist politics and the impotence of established democratic institutions and processes—became manifest in a growing impasse in national policy-making. The consequences were mounting economic difficulties, rising insurgency and lawlessness in the countryside, heavy rural migration to Manila and a radicalized mass movement demanding more basic economic and political reforms and an end to special relations with the United States. In-migration to MMA compounded the area's existing problems—high population density, its rapid growth and uneven geographic distribution; large differences in living standards and personal incomes; the lack of basic amenities in many places, and generally unequal distribution of urban services; the housing shortage, pollution, high crime rate—which are all interrelated and stem from Manila's historical growth and rapid economic development while the rest of the country remained relatively underdeveloped.

The continuing lack of policies to deal with the broader national issues led to changes in the alignment of political forces in the country which became evident in Manila. These were a decline in the power and prestige of Congress vis-a-vis the President, a strengthening of the military organization and its growing involvement in civic projects, an increasing role of technocrats in national administration, and the rising popularity of radical nationalist groups.²¹ A Constitutional Convention called in 1971 to meet demands for economic and political reforms failed to create a national consensus. It was plagued by the same factional divisions and procedural problems that had immobilized Congress.²² The political crisis came to a head in the wake of disastrous floods in the metropolitan area and in Central Luzon in July-August 1972. With economic collapse imminent, the spectre of anarchy in the country and stalemated policy-making in Congress, President Ferdinand E. Marcos declared a state of Martial Law in September of that year.

Martial Law government provided the opportunity for instituting national reforms and reorganization. Priority was given to pressing national problems such as economic development and the conquest of poverty and

social inequality. Economic planning was systematized and centralized under the National Economic and Development Authority which has been chaired by the President. The long-term goals for national economic development included the modernization of agriculture to bring about self-sufficiency and increase in export crops, land reform, a higher level of industrialization especially for export, exploration and development of natural resources, adequacy of domestic energy sources and promotion of rural and regional development. These were to be achieved through increased public expenditures for infrastructure, encouragement of private enterprise and foreign investment. Policy-making and implementation were facilitated and coordinated through presidential decrees. Congress was dissolved, the Executive departments were reorganized and new agencies were created to make the bureaucracy serve the needs of the New Society.²³

Steps were also immediately taken to tackle Metropolitan Manila's deteriorating urban conditions. It was apparent that MMA reform was not just a question of rationalizing local government in the area but an integral part of the strategy for national economic development, i.e. the drive to attract more foreign investment, to make Manila the regional headquarters of multinational corporations in Southeast Asia, and to promote the tourist industry.²⁴ At a general level of analysis, metropolitan reform appears to reinforce Manila's historic role as the center for capital accumulation and surplus extraction by the dominant elite in the continuing dependent development of the Philippines. The creation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) may thus be seen as further concentration of central government power to carry out a national development plan which relies heavily on foreign capital. From the perspective of Manila's traditional importance as the base of opposition to the central government, the MMC may also be viewed as an effort to neutralize anti-Marcos politicians and radical groups, and, thus, as a reactive policy to potentially serious opposition to the regime.

At a more specific level of analysis, the MMC represents a technical answer to the problems of urban government, following the traditional metropolitan reorganization approach which emphasizes economy and efficiency. It attempts to balance the need for a metropolitan authority to provide area-wide services, the need for effective local government to take care of local services, and the need for grassroots institutions for citizen participation. Support for MMA reform came from all classes—politicians, businessmen, upper and middle class organization, professional groups, academicians, workers and the general public.²⁵ Such broad support has been similarly observed in successful metropolitan reorganizations in other countries. As Magnusson has pointed out, with reference to Metropolitan Toronto:

Metropolitan reform may be regarded as a product of class struggle and a consequence of the contradictions of capitalist society, but it cannot be

attributed to the demands or requirements of any one class in isolation. Like so many other reforms in the capitalist societies, it commands support from both capital and labour.²⁶

As provided for by Presidential Decree No. 824 (November 1975), MMA's 17 local governments were placed under a five-member MMC appointed and supervised by the President.²⁷ But because of vacancies in the MMC Board, policy-making and implementation for MMA have been solely exercised since that time by MMC Governor Imelda R. Marcos. Until 1979, she was assisted in her work by a team of Action Officers (AOs) who had been seconded from their positions in various national and local government offices. The AOs were chosen by Mrs. Marcos herself and had previously worked with her in government projects. Mrs. Marcos' appointment to the position was ostensibly made in response to popular demand for her managerial abilities and national prestige.²⁸

Since 1979, policy-making in MMC has become more institutionalized. The MMC Governor continues to exercise the ultimate policy-making functions of MMC but there is now an MMC Policy Board composed of the Vice-Governor who is also acting as Commissioner for Operations, the Commissioner for Finance and the Commissioner for Planning and meets at least once a month or more frequently as the need arises.²⁹

The originally elected mayors of the 17 MMA units were retained as local chief executives responsible to MMC and, upon the expiration of their terms in 1976, were either reappointed or replaced by the President. The elected city/municipal councils were supposed to be transformed into local consultative councils (*Sangguniang Bayans*) with their membership expanded to include selected members of lower level local bodies (Barangays), local youth organizations (Kabataang Barangays) and appointed representatives of private sector groups—capital, professional, industrial and agricultural labor, which altogether made up the metropolitan consultative council (*Sanggunian ng Kalakhang Maynila*).

Elections for mayors and vice-mayors in Metropolitan Manila were held on 16 June 1981. Those elected were to serve for a term of six years. Barangay elections (for barangay captain and six councilmen in each barangay) were similarly held on 17 May 1982. There have been no elections so far for the metropolitan and local Sangguniang Bayan which have been inactive.³⁰

Creation of the MMC has brought about the integration of services in MMA such as police, health, refuse management and environmental sanitation, infrastructure development, traffic management and operations, treasury and assessment, and the development of metropolitan-wide mass transportation. The coordination of services in the area has been facilitated

through the pooling of local finances to support metro-wide services and an integrated budget system for MMC and MMA local units.³¹ MMC's innovations in financial management and budgeting have been directed towards the maintenance of certain minimum standards of service delivery among local governments and provision of safeguards against expenditures for primarily partisan patronage, thus avoiding the piece-meal approach and wasteful local expenditures in the past. MMC has made possible the formulation of a unified plan to guide program planning and policy-making for MMA's urban growth and development.

Metropolitan reorganization has made it institutionally more possible to move towards a solution of urban problems by removing overlapping and competing jurisdictions of the area's local governments and superimposing the MMC as a higher authority. The prestige and political influence of Mrs. Marcos as Governor has enabled her to function effectively as an area manager providing coordination between national departments, MMC operations and local government functions. As the President's wife, she has been assured of the necessary national government support—financial resources, technical assistance from national departments, and mobilization of armed forces personnel for infrastructure construction—for projects in MMA. Mrs. Marcos' other appointment as concurrently Minister for Human Settlements places her in an even better position to coordinate MMC's policies and programs regarding MMA's urban renewal and development with those of the nation.

While the initial *ad hoc* arrangement in MMC's organization undoubtedly resulted in flexibility and expedition in policy-making and implementation, it has also had its drawbacks. The effectiveness of MMC's functioning has greatly depended on the personal leadership of Mrs. Marcos and her team of AOs rather than institutionalized standard operating procedures. There has been a lack of clarity in the division of powers and functions between MMC and the local units, and within local units, i.e. between cities/municipalities and *barangays*, and this has resulted in problems of coordination below the level of the Governor. There are large disparities in area, population and financial resources among the local units.

Given the time that has elapsed since metropolitan reorganization was implemented, there is now a need to implement the MMC structure as provided by Presidential Decree 824 to institutionalize more fully metropolitan government. This could be done under the leadership of Mrs. Marcos and the President's support. The division of functions and responsibilities between MMC and the local units, within local units, and between MMC and national departments need to be clarified. There is need to redraw local boundaries, to amalgamate them into fewer and bigger units for more rational administration of services. Along with this is the need to evolve a system of metropolitan grants to provide more equitable distribution of revenues among

MMA units. Similarly, the national government could design a system of matching grants with MMC on programs that are within national priorities.

Although the scope for citizen participation under MMC has been broadened through the increase in grass-roots organizations, much of this has been characterized essentially by articulation of needs and consultation in local policy-implementation, information on new policies and citizen mobilization in support of national policies through referendums. The suspension of local elections and the subsequent appointment of local officials by the President or MMC from 1976 to 1981 effectively reduced the influence of political parties and the traditional politicians, eliminated wasteful local expenditures connected with election campaigns and patronage, and has allegedly contributed to more rational local administration. The financial resources of grass-roots organizations have also been increased by MMC. Undoubtedly, these changes resulted in greater mass support for MMC and the Marcos administration. However, the situation has also made local officials dependent on the government and this tends to inhibit local initiative in policy-making. The provisions for private sector representation in local consultative councils and citizens committees would seem to have reduced the need for pressure group politics. Yet there are indications that this has tended to make local officials intolerant of the views held by certain unrepresented civic groups.

There is clearly a need for more studies on citizen participation in MMC and its constituent units. These would show whether the recently established channels of local participation are genuinely effective in providing citizen access to policy-making and in providing popular feedback on the implementation of urban policies. These would indicate what changes should be made to ensure that Metro Manilans are given substantive participation in the formulation of programs and policies that directly affect them.

While the national government's drive to make Metropolitan Manila attractive to foreign business and tourists has brought about improvements in MMA's infrastructure and public services, and has ostensibly resulted in better living conditions for some Metro Manilans, this may also have contributed to inflation. This is due to a tendency for middle class living standards to be pushed up to international levels by the increasing linkages between Manila and other metropolitan areas in the world. There are indications that the working class and urban poor have suffered most from this inflation. The improvements in MMA's infrastructure have also resulted in the growing concentration of national government expenditures in the area. Considering the government's limited financial resources, this may be at the expense of other regions thus exacerbating regional inequality. There is need for further research on the consequences of increased national support for MMA in order to remedy contradictions between this and other policies such as rural development, agrarian reform and more equitable regional income distribution.

The case of housing illustrates the way in which MMC has functioned to attempt a solution to a complex urban problem and the articulation between national plans and programs with those of MMC. The National Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager has been concurrently MMC's Action Officer for Housing and thus MMC's public housing program has been essentially NHA's responsibility. A multi-pronged approach, utilizing the concept of human settlements, has been applied to address MMA's housing problem. This has included social housing projects, and relocation and resettlement of squatters and slum dwellers from unsafe areas.³²

Social or low-cost housing projects have been made joint ventures between MMA local governments and NHA. This is in contrast to past practice which excluded local government involvement in housing delivery. Local governments have provided NHA with up-to-date census of actual residents in slum areas for sites and services projects and have been made responsible for preventing squatters from reoccupying vacant lands. The MMC and the national government have embarked on a zonal improvement program designed to upgrade physical and social amenities in MMA's blighted communities through the provision of adequate public services—sewerage, water, power, drainage, roads, markets and others. Privately-owned estates, whose owners have refused to participate in the improvement of sites and services and who have been delinquent in paying property taxes, have been ordered expropriated by NHA for low-cost housing projects. These projects may not have been possible under the previously fragmented political authority in MMA and the patron-client networks between local politicians, private property owners, members of Congress and urban residents.

NHA-MMC housing policy has been linked to the national government's regional development program which is an important component of the integrated national development plan. The program is aimed at reducing disparities in regional income distribution and thus to help mitigate the migration of the rural population to urban areas, particularly the MMA.³³ Recent NHA and MMC housing policy has included plans for the establishment of new towns near the metropolitan area and dispersal of industry to these places. These would serve as relocation sites for MMA squatters and slum dwellers and also attract new rural migrants, thus helping to slow down MMA's urban growth. These policies appear to be in accord with the general view of contemporary writers on Third World urbanization that urban problems require not just narrow technical solutions but also broader political and socioeconomic strategies. Friedmann and Rondinelli, for example, have stressed the need for policies to promote urbanization and balanced regional development including planned spatial distribution and of smaller size urban areas based on a mix of capital-intensive and labor intensive technologies.³⁴ In this connection, Roberto points out that "to make such development possible. . . requires among other things radical changes in income distribution and in patterns of consumption."³⁵

With regard to the need for changes in patterns of consumption in order to bring about balanced regional growth, this requires policies to discourage conspicuous consumption and Western-style consumerism among the middle and upper classes. There are difficulties inherent in this issue considering the government's emphasis on export-oriented industrialization, the role of multinational corporation, tourism and others. The MMC's campaign for the development of simpler housing designs suited to Philippine cultural values and present economic conditions is a step in consciously changing patterns of consumption. This would help to promote a labor-intensive local housing industry, thus creating more employment opportunities in MMA. It would, in turn, greatly reduce the cost of public housing projects since standards recommended by Western-oriented planners and architects have sometimes proved to be wasteful and inappropriate to local needs.³⁶

On the whole, there is need for MMC to organize its own Housing Office and to formulate its own housing program to enable the NHA to devote more time and attention to the national housing program. The MMC needs to make innovations in real property tax laws to produce revenue and discourage pernicious urban land speculation; to explore alternative policies for public authority intervention on land such as land banking and large-scale public land development; to encourage the development of housing cooperatives in MMA; to undertake inter-class subsidy/trade-off in public housing sale and letting, and to adopt other measures to promote MMA's more orderly development and minimize the social problems that have accompanied Manila's past urban growth. MM's success with these policies could be used to guide the development of other urban areas which could then attract rural migrants who would otherwise drift to Metropolitan Manila.

Philippine Development Prospects and MMA's Future

The reorganization of MMA's government was made possible under Martial Law administration. In January 1981, Martial Law was formally lifted and a modified parliamentary government is being gradually instituted. Given this change, one may ask what are the prospects for Philippine development and continuing reform in MMA considering the city's dual contradictory roles in the past, i.e. as catalyst, facilitating modernization of traditional society and promoting economic and political change; and as parasitic, whose growth has been sustained by the drain of human and material resources from the countryside, thus hindering rural and regional development.

The professed objective of the present national government is to make the Philippines self-reliant in its socioeconomic development and thus capable of satisfying the rising mass expectations for equitable distribution of growth and effective popular participation in central and local policy-making

and implementation. Yet, at the same time, the regime is aware of the reality of the country's continuing economic dependence upon the outside world. This involves the need for foreign capital, i.e. for multinational corporations to finance industrialization, for loans from international lending institutions to finance infrastructure and resource development programs; to import oil and Western industrial technology; for markets for its agricultural products and other exports. Such dependence necessitates the adoption of policies that would create a favorable climate for foreign investment. These would include, for example, provision of modern facilities such as roads, transportation and communications network, etc.; tractable labor relations, guarantees for repatriation of profits and others. These not only impinge on the determination of priorities in the allocation of government resources but also make the domestic economy subject to the unpredictable fluctuations in the world economic situation.

There appear to be some inherent contradictions resulting from the government's long-term program of capitalist development (with heavy reliance on foreign capital), its promotion of export-oriented import-dependent industrialization, and its avowed goal of eradicating mass poverty and social inequality. Writers examining the consequences of Third World capitalist industrialization have pointed out that while multinational corporations and foreign loans to local industries may have substantially contributed to overall economic growth, the benefits have gone mainly to the few.³⁸ The increase in national income has not trickled down to the masses as had been optimistically assumed, and income inequality has persisted if not worsened. Moreover, it is argued that heavy dependence on foreign capital and export-oriented industrialization renders a developing country's economy vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the world market. There are indications too that development of export-oriented agribusiness through multinational corporations tends to increase this vulnerability of Third World economies. It has been reported that expansion of agribusiness estates has resulted in the displacement of many occupant farmers and indigenous minorities.³⁹ It may be speculated that the displaced farmers may contribute to further rural-urban migration and thus make balanced regional development even more difficult to achieve. It is also doubtful whether urban-based industries, which tend to be capital-intensive, could absorb all these unemployed migrants.

Recent events in the Philippines, especially after the dramatic assassination of former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. on 21 August 1983, have tended to confirm many of the above observations. The assassination opened a Pandora's box setting loose the hitherto hidden accumulated socioeconomic and political ills, thus triggering the crisis that had been building up during the preceding years. The economic recession in the late 1970s and early 1980s that had plagued the developed capitalist countries, the Philippines' main trading partners, adversely affected the country's precarious balance of payments as the developed countries cut down their imports of Philippine pro-

ducts. The recession had also made multinational corporations hesitant to proceed with industrial projects that they had earlier proposed to undertake in the Philippines.⁴⁰ Faced with the bleak economic prospects, the government was forced to further devalue the peso in June 1983 to make Philippine exports cheaper and thus attract more buyers. This was done also to bring in more dollars into the country to enable it to pay back its accumulated external debt. But the wave of anti-government rallies and demonstrations following Aquino's assassination further aggravated the already critical situation, undermining foreign investors' confidence in the Marcos government and thus bringing about a massive capital flight.⁴¹

In the face of the ensuing popular unrest, the closing of industries, massive layoffs, spiralling inflation, etc., various groups have come out with their diagnosis of the causes of and the necessary solutions to the crisis.⁴² Advocates of the nationalist alternative to development have renewed their campaign urging the government to review its primarily export-oriented, import-dependent and heavily foreign debt-funded development strategy and opt for more indigenous industrial development involving small-scale, labor-intensive projects utilizing more appropriate technology and raw materials. This path will be geared at exploiting the growing domestic market of over 50 million Filipinos, minimizing economic and social disruptions resulting from negative developments in the international market. If this alternative policy would be adopted, then regional development programs may receive greater attention than in the past, and thus help lessen rural to urban migration, particularly to Metropolitan Manila. This would in turn ease the pressures on urban development programs and delivery of services in the metropolitan area.

Philippine politics will, in the short and long run, be substantially affected by economic developments such as inflation. By 1980 the Philippine consumer price index had gone up to 294.7 percent from its 100 percent 1972 level. Metropolitan Manila experienced a slightly lower level at 284.1 percent. Real wage rates for laborers in industrial establishments in Metropolitan Manila in September 1980 had gone down from its 100 percent 1972 levels: 63.2 percent for skilled workers and 52.5 percent for unskilled workers.⁴⁴ By April 1984, the consumer price index had reached 254.58 from its 100 percent 1978 level. During the same period, the purchasing power of the peso had decreased to a low of P0.3928 from its 1978 level of P1.00. Inflation rate during the one-year period April 1983 to April 1984 had increased from 6.2 percent to 40.7 percent.⁴⁵ These figures underscore the increasing social and political pressures for coping with the rising cost of living and further deteriorating living standards.

Domestic inflation has been aggravated by the rising Philippine public debt. As of 1981, the internal debt had grown to P49,338.8 million, up by

398.3 percent ₱38,637.4 million) from its 1972 level of ₱9,701.4 million. The external debt had, during the same year, reached US \$10,941.0 million, representing an increment of 834 percent (US \$9,769.6 million) from that of 1972's US \$1,171.4 million.⁴⁶ By the first quarter of 1984, the external debt had reached US \$25.2 billion.⁴⁷ Servicing the public debt will create more problems of competing demands for public expenditures, especially those needed for economic and social development. Pressures on the country's foreign exchange earnings have been strong with the growing external debt and may further undermine efforts at sustained economic development. These may contribute to more domestic inflation and greater erosion of workers' real wages.

The introduction of a modified parliamentary government poses problems of policy-making and the implementation of the present government's long-range development plan. There are indications that this change has revived past cleavages between the elite and masses and among the elite—the incumbent politicians, government technocrats, the military, landowners, nationalist entrepreneurs, Filipino industrialists advocating joint ventures with foreign capitalists and the traditional politicians. The May 1984 elections for the Batasang Pambansa resulted in a significantly strengthened opposition with 71 seats (39 percent) to the ruling KBL's 113 seats (61 percent) compared to the overwhelmingly KBL-dominated 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa. Nevertheless, opposition to the present administration remains fragmented and personalities rather than programs or issues continue to dominate national politics. Certain groups are still excluded from the policy-making process. There is thus a danger that the semi-parliamentary government may deteriorate, as was the case with Congress, and be replaced again by authoritarian rule.

The present government apparently recognizes the need to develop an effective party system to make parliamentary government viable and ensure genuine popular representation. There are signs, for example, that it has tried to explore the possibility of legalizing the outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Such a policy would be a significant step in expanding lower class representation in the Batasang Pambansa and greatly increase the success of basic reforms. It would also stimulate existing political parties to developed broader-based and program-oriented organizations. The possible obstacles to government initiatives for political accommodation along this line are the initial and deep-seated distrust from the CPP and other radical groups due to past experience with government, particularly during the 1950s; and the distrust of these groups by the hardline military faction which has been trained in Cold War values. President Marcos may yet prove useful in promoting national reconciliation since his World War II record and experience in national politics makes him trusted by the military. His policy thrust at opening diplomatic relations with China, the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries may not have been so speedily accomplished without the

support of the military. The current international geopolitical configuration in Southeast Asia—the changing interests and shifting alliances among the big powers (People's Republic of China, U.S.S.R., the United States) and involving the Association of South East Asian Nations, Vietnam and Kampuchea—could help sustain a broader democratic Philippine political system than was possible in the early postwar era.

It seems that Filipinos have manifestly more points of agreement regarding basic social issues. Both elite and radical groups talk about democracy, land reform, "a better deal for the common man," the politically explosive nature of social inequality, etc. These could serve as the bases for national political accommodation, reconciliation, bargaining and compromise. Indeed, Philippine political leaders, as in other developing countries, are caught in a web of contradictions between, on the one hand, their own vision of bringing government closer to the public, and on the other, their own narrow class interests and developmental models sustained by their foreign allies. But popular slogans must in the end be translated into concrete policies that must transform existing social and economic structures which would, in turn, promote more egalitarian concepts and institutions reflecting the genuine interests of the masses. Great improvements in education and mass communications have raised people's expectations. Promises from political and other leaders have mobilized the people. If there is no serious attempt at genuine reconciliation in national politics, then the social cleavages nurtured by the social ideals of the 1896 Revolution, polemically made afresh thereafter but not seriously addressed and dealt with by the government, may yet polarize Philippine society further and portend greater social upheavals.

In this context, the MMA with its concentration of the country's educated and highly politicized population, mass media of communications, industry and government, may find itself once more increasingly in the forefront of radical change. Paradoxically, the objective accomplishments of MMC under Martial Law in solving pressing urban problems have further raised mass expectations of performance by politicians and administrators and encouraged more popular participation in governmental affairs. Thus local and national officials may have realized by this time that they must be more consistent in the implementation of articulated policies for metropolitan reform.

Concluding Observations: Agenda for Further Research

In summary, then, MMA's problems of urban growth are similar, at a certain level, to those of other established metropolises; but at a deeper level, the reform of Metropolitan Manila government has more basic national implications—political, social and economic—which require integrated solu-

tions. Metropolitan reorganization reflects Manila's central role in Philippine political change and socioeconomic development. The drive to improve MMA's deteriorating conditions has been part and parcel of the Martial Law government's development strategy—involving such issues as the need to improve urban services to attract foreign investments, to promote regional development, to reduce social inequality and others—as much as the problem of rationalizing local government in the area. There has been a deliberate effort to gear MMC's policies and programs with those of the national government's development plan. MMA's structure under the present leadership and the changes in local administration and grassroots organization facilitate the coordination of MMC and national government activities in the area.

The government has initiated various policies to deal with the roots of MMA's urban problems and there have been visible achievements, particularly in the improvement of service delivery. Much more remains to be done and there is need for further studies on the consequences of metropolitan reorganization. There is need to monitor and scrutinize the impact of MMC policies: to assess, for example, the beneficiaries of the new public housing projects, the areas and income classes served by improved public transport and other services. Such research would show whether these are indeed working to help redress the glaring social inequality or are merely reinforcing the privileged position of the middle and upper classes as had been the experience in past government housing projects in Metropolitan Manila.⁴⁹ There is need to find out whether the initial gains in improved public services in MMA are being sustained and to verify the extent of citizen participation in metropolitan and local government.

At the national level, there is need for research to determine whether Metropolitan Manila is really sucking the economic surplus from other regions and to what extent this surplus is lost to the country. This entails investigations of the extent of capital repatriation by foreign investors in the Philippines. Results of these and other relevant studies could be used to guide future MMC program planning and policy-making to ensure that the promises of metropolitan reform will be achieved and to provide national planners and policy-makers with much-needed data for evaluating development plans, policies and strategies.

On the whole, there is need for strong political will, and for sincere and committed leadership to sustain the policies for metropolitan reform and to resolve the apparent contradictions between the goals and strategies adopted. While MMA's primacy and urban growth may seem irreversible, the experience of some other countries suggest that it can be controlled and regulated.

Endnotes

¹ The primate city concept refers to the relationship in population size between the largest city in a country and the other cities in that same country. The concept was first introduced by Mark Jefferson in "The Law of the Primate City," *Geographical Review*, Vol. XXIX (1939), pp. 226-232. Primacy is associated with the "degree of dominance" of the leading urban center. There are three commonly used demographic measures for primacy in contemporary urban studies: (1) the percentage of total national population residing in the principal urban center (metropolitan area); (2) the percentage of national urban population residing in the principal urban center; and (3) the ratio of the population of the principal urban center to the sum of the population of the next three or more largest centers. An urban center is usually defined as a city of over 100,000 population although 20,000 is sometimes used.

² Nicholas P. Cushner, S.J., *Spain in the Philippines; from Conquest to Revolution* (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Co., Inc., 1971), pp. 189-200; Antonio M. Regidor y Jurado and J. Warren T. Mason, *Commercial Progress in the Philippine Islands* (London, 1905; reprinted in Manila: American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippine Islands, April 1925), pp. 20-40.

³ On the growth of landed estates and its social and political consequences, see Nicholas P. Cushner, *Landed Estates in the Colonial Philippines* (Monograph Series No. 20; New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1976), esp. chs. III-VI. For a more general account of friar lands, see also Dennis Morrow Roth, *The Friar Estates of the Philippines* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1977).

⁴ Teodoro A. Agoncillo, "The Filipino Intellectuals and the Revolution," *Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review*, Vol. XVII (June 1953), pp. 125-140 and his *The Revolt of the Masses; The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1956), ch. III; Cesar Adib Majul, *The Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Philippine Revolution* (rev. ed.; Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1967), chs. I and IX; James A. Le Roy, *The Americans in the Philippines: A History of the Conquest and First Years of the Occupation*, Vol. I (Boston and New York: Houghton (Mifflin Co., 1914), pp. 63-78.

⁵ On class and politics under the American regime, see Joseph Ralston Hayden, *The Philippines: A Study in National Development* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1942), pp. 299-308, 348, 376-384; Bonifacio S. Salamanca, *The Filipino Reaction to American Rule, 1901-1913* (Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, 1968), pp. 104, 168-177; Peter W. Stanley, *A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 102, 183-184, 274-276 and ch. IX; Renato Constantino, *The Philippines: A Past Revisited* (Quezon City: Tala Publishing Services, 1975), pp. 325-347; D. Boone Schirmer, "The Philippines: Conception and Gestation of a Neo-Colony," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. V, No. 1, 1975), pp. 53-69; Claude A. Buss, *The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy* (AEI-Hoover Policy Studies, 23; Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), pp. 9-13.

⁶ Shirley Jenkins, *American Economic Policy Toward the Philippines* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954), pp. 47-49, chs. IV-V; Cheryl Ann Payer, "Exchange Controls and National Capitalism: The Philippine Experience," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. III, No. 1 (1973), pp. 55-59; Buss, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-122; Renato Constantino and Letizia R. Constantino, *The Philippines: The Continuing Past* (Quezon City: The Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978), pp. 198-206.

⁷For a contemporary account of the immediate postwar Philippine politics, see Henando J. Abaya, *Betrayal in the Philippines* (New York: A.A. Wyn, Inc., 1946). See also Stephen R. Shalom, "Philippine Acceptance of the Bell Trade Act of 1946: A Study of Manipulatory Democracy," *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. XLIX, No. 3 (August 1980), pp. 499-517 and his *The United States and the Philippines: A Study of Neocolonialism* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1981), ch. 2.

⁸For a personal account of United States involvement in the anti-Huk campaign in the Philippines and in Magsaysay's election as President, see Edward G. Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars: An American Mission to Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), chs. 1-6. See also Constantino and Constantino. *op. cit.*, pp. 231-268; David O.D. Wurfel, "The Bell Report and After: A Study of the Political Problems of Social Reform Stimulated by Foreign Aid" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis submitted to Cornell University, February 1960), pp. 440-442; Jose V. Abueva, *Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography* (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1971), esp. chs. XIV to XXII.

⁹On Philippine political parties and clientelist politics, see Mary R. Holsteiner, *The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, Community Development Research Council, 1963), ch. 3; Carl Lande, *Leaders, Factions, and Parties; The Structure of Philippine Politics* (Monograph Series No. 6; New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1964); Onofre D. Corpuz, *The Philippines* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), esp. chs. 3-5; Dapen Liang, *Philippine Parties and Politics; A Historical Study of National Experience in Democracy* (new ed.; San Francisco: The Gladstone Co., 1970), chs. IX-X; Donn V. Hart, *Compadrinazgo: Ritual Kinship in the Philippines* (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1977), esp. pp. 135-139; 154-158, 182-183, 217-222.

¹⁰William J. Pomeroy, *An American Made Tragedy: Neo-Colonialism and Dictatorship in the Philippines* (New York: International Publishers, 1974), pp. 36-38; Constantino and Constantino, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

¹¹For details on these problems, see Manuel A. Caoili, "The Government of Metropolitan Manila: Metropolitan Reorganization in a Developing Country" (Ph.D. Thesis, Queen's University at Kingston, Canada, 1982), pp. 124-167.

¹²Cushner, *Spain in the Philippines*, pp. 113-126; John Leddy Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, 1565-1700* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1959), pp. 146-149; Constantino, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-98, Corpuz, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

¹³Cushner, *Spain in the Philippines*, pp. 192-200; Benito Fernandez Legarda, Jr., "Foreign Trade, Economic Change and Entrepreneurship in the Nineteenth-Century Philippines" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., April 1955), pp. 123-165, 177-178, 321-324.

¹⁴Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses*, p. 122, ch. IV; John N. Schumacher, "Manila, Cradle of the Revolution," *UNITAS*, Vol. XLVI, No. 3 (September 1971), pp. 56-57; Constantino, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-162, 167-169.

¹⁵On Manila under the American regime, see John Foreman, *The Philippine Islands* (3rd ed.; London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1906), ch. XXVIII; James A. Le Roy, *Philippine Life*

in *Town and Country* (New York and London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1905), pp. 97-98 and *passim*. On the attempts at planned urban development during the period, see Hayden, *op. cit.* pp. 302-304; A.V.H. Hartendorp, *History of Industry and Trade of the Philippines* (Manila: American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Inc., 1958), Vol. I, pp. 410-411; Carlos P. Ramos, "Manila's Metropolitan Problem," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. V: No. 2 (April 1961), pp. 94-95.

¹⁶ Hayden, *op. cit.*, pp. 299-308; Liang, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

¹⁷ On Manila's housing problem and colonial policy, see Arthur L. Shepard, "Governmental Aid and Control of the Growth of the City of Manila, 1900-1930" (unpublished Master's thesis submitted to the University of Michigan, 1937) pp. 38-46; 78-81, 96-100; Hayden, *op. cit.*, p. 654; Romeo B. Ocampo, "Historical Development of Philippine Housing Policy. Part I. Prewar Housing Policy" (Occasional Paper No. 6; Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, November 1976, mimeo), pp. 2-7.

¹⁸ Manuel A. Caoili, "Notes on Metropolitan Manila Reorganization," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XII, Nos. 3 & 4 (July-October 1978), Tables 3 & 4, pp. 342-343. For more data on the disparities in the distribution of personal incomes, local financial resources and public services in the MMA, see Caoili, "The Government of Metropolitan Manila. . .," 142-157. The 1980 figures were computed from unpublished statistics from the Commission on Audit and population data from the National Census and Statistics Office.

¹⁹ A notable example was Quezon City's Citizens League for Good Government. See Jose V. Abueva, "The Citizens League and the 1959 Local Elections," in Raul P. de Guzman, ed., *Patterns in Decision-Making: Case Studies in Philippine Public Administration* (Manila: Graduate School of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1963), pp. 487-527; Romeo B. Ocampo, "The Reorganization Program of Quezon City: Mayor-Council Relations in the Formulation and Implementation of Reform Policy," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. VII, No. 3 (July 1963), pp. 184-219; Aprodicio A. Laquian, "Politics in Metropolitan Manila," *PJPA*, Vol. IX, No. 4 (October 1965), pp. 331-342.

²⁰ These were the agreement for cooperative law enforcement among several cities and municipalities whose implementing arm was the United Intelligence Operations Group, Inter-Police Coordinating Center; the Inter-Urban Mutual Assistance-Fire Protection Organization; Metropolitan Health Council and the Metropolitan Mayors Coordinating Council. See Inter-Agency Committee on Metropolitan Manila, *Metropolitan Manila Authority: A Development and Reform Strategy Proposal* (Manila: Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 29, 194; Metro Manila Research Team, *Restructuring Government in Metropolitan Manila* (Manila: Local Government Center, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippine, 1973, mimeo.), pp. 40, 143-144; Arturo G. Pacho, *Role of Government in the Development Process in the Philippines* (Nagoya, Japan: United Nations Centre for Regional Development, September 1973, mimeo.), p. 60; "Metro Mayors' Council Formed; Body to Coordinate Plans," *Local Government Bulletin*, Vol. VII, No. 1 (January-February 1972), pp. 1-15.

²¹ For evidences and insights on the changing relations between these political forces in the 1960s, see, for example, Robert B. Stauffer, *The Philippine Congress: Causes of Structural Change* (Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1975); Richard Styskal, "Some Aspects of Groups Representation in the Philippine Congress," in G.R. Boynton and Chong Lim Kim, eds., *Legislative Systems in Developing Countries* (Durham, N.C.:

Duke University Press, 1975), pp. 233-260; Remigio E. Agpalo, "The Roles of Legislators in the Philippine Political System," *Philippine Political Science Journal*, No. 4 (December 1976), pp. 44-64; Quintin R. de Borja, Armando N. Gatmaitan and Gregorio C. de Castro, "Notes on the Role of the Military in Socio-Economic Development," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration (PJPA)*, Vol. XII, No. 3 (July 1968), pp. 266-283; Romeo B. Ocampo, "Technocrats and Planning: Sketch and Exploration," *PJPA*, Vol. XV, No. 1 (January 1971), pp. 31-64; J.C. Rivera, "The Student Revolt and Local Governments," *Local Government Bulletin*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (January-February 1970), pp. 7, 13, 16; Robert O. Tiltman, "The Philippines in 1970: A Difficult Decade Begins," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XI, No. 2 (February 1971), pp. 139-144; Jose V. Abueva, ed., *Filipino Politics, Nationalism and Emerging Ideologies: Background for Constitution-Making* (Manila: The Modern Book Co., 1972).

²² See, for example, Vicenta Rimando, "Con-Con After Nine Months," *Local Government Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 1 (January-February 1972), pp. 6-7.

²³ See Perla A. Segovia, "Administrative Reorganization, Institutional Development and Management Improvement," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration (PJPA)*, Vol. XXI, Nos. 3 & 4 (July-October 1977), pp. 235-282; Santiago S. Simpás and Vivian Mariano, "Policy Making Under Martial Law," *PJPA*, Vol. XXII, Nos. 3 & 4 (July-October 1978), pp. 223-253; Jose P. Tabbada and Francisco G. Balitaan, "Planning and Financing Under Martial Law," *PJPA, ibid.*, pp. 292-312; Presidential Commission on Reorganization, "Organizing for Development," *PJPA, ibid.*, pp. 383-406.

²⁴ Robert B. Stauffer, "The Political Economy of Refeudalization," in D.A. Rosenberg, ed., *Marcos and Martial Law in the Philippines* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 208-218; Linda Richter, "The Political Uses of Tourism: A Philippine Case Study," *The Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (January 1980), pp. 237-257.

²⁵ There were several studies and proposals made for MMA reform in 1972-1974 from groups such as the Inter-Agency Committee on Metropolitan Manila created by the President in November 1972; the University of the Philippines Local Government Center; Development Academy of the Philippines; Metropolitan Manila Mayors Coordinating Council; the Metro Manila Councilors Assembly and others. For details, see Caoili, "The Government of Metropolitan Manila . . .," pp. 265-277. A referendum was held in Metropolitan Manila Area (MMA) on 27 February 1975 to determine whether the electorate were in favor of retaining the existing mayor-council government or would support the integration of MMA under a manager-commission type of organization. The results were: 29 percent (948, 323) voted for retention of existing mayor-council form of government; 61 per cent (1,995,619) were for an integrated MMA under a manager-commission; 10 per cent (336, 794) abstained. See *Times Journal*, 16 March 1975, pp. 1, 15.

²⁶ Warren Magnusson, "Metropolitan Reform in the Capitalist City," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (September 1981), p. 558.

²⁷ P.D. 824, Sec. 3, provides for the following major officials of MMC: a Chairman or Governor, a Vice-Chairman or Vice-Governor and three Commissioners or Board Members—one for planning, one for finance and one for operations. All are appointed by the President and hold office at his pleasure. In fact, only the Governor and Vice-Governor have so far been appointed. The MMC Board has not yet been formally organized.

²⁸See, for example, "Caloocan Proposes First Lady for First Metro Manila Manager," *Philippine Evening Express*, 5 March 1975; "Metro Brass, Barangays Back FL Draft," *Evening Post*, 30 October 1975; "First Lady Proposed as Metro Executive," *The Times Journal*, 30 October 1975; "Endorse F. Lady as Manager of Metro Manila," *Bulletin Today*, 30 October 1975; "Proposal to Appoint FL Gains," *Bulletin Today*, 4 November 1975; "Grass Roots Back F. Lady," *The Times Journal*, 4 November 1975; "City Folks Endorse First Lady," *The Times Journal*, 6 November 1975.

²⁹There are still a number of Action Officers, i.e. national officials serving as consultants to MMC. These are in Traffic Education, Transportation, Housing, Education, Information, Infrastructure and Peace and Order. From interview with MMC Commissioner for Finance, Mauro Calaguio, Quezon City, 21 July 1983. Calaguio and Nathaniel von Einsiedel now occupy the positions of Commissioner for Finance and Commissioner for Planning, respectively, although they have not been formally sworn into office as such in accordance with P.D. 824. They are thus still acting as assistants to the Governor. From interview with J. Mario Laqui, Special Assistant to the Vice Governor, MMC, 26 October 1983.

³⁰Interview with Hermie P. Hernandez, Chief Administrative Services, Barangay Operations Center, MMC, 26 October 1983.

³¹For details on this, see Caoili, "The Government of Metropolitan Manila. . .," pp. 281-337; Metro Manila Commission, *A Humanist Approach to Urban Management*, (Manila: 1982).

³²Caoili, "The Government of Metropolitan Manila. . .," pp. 399-420.

³³On regional development policies, see Republic of the Philippines, *Five-Year Philippine Development Plan, 1978-1982; Including the Ten-Year Development Plan, 1978-1987* (Manila: September 1977), ch. 3.

³⁴John Friedmann, *Urbanization, Planning, and National Development* (Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1973); Dennis A. Rondinelli, "Balanced Urbanization, Spatial Integration and Economic Development in Asia: Implications for Policy and Planning," *Urbanism Past & Present*, No. 9 (Winter 1978-80), pp. 13-29; Rondinelli and Kenneth Ruddle, *Urbanization and Rural Development; A Spatial Policy for Equitable Growth* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978). A more comprehensive set of policies for more autonomous regional planning and development may be seen in Walter B. Stohr, "Development from Below: The Bottom-Up and Periphery-Inward Development Paradigm," in Walter B. Stohr and D.R. Praser Taylor, eds., *Development from Above or Below?: The Dialectics of Regional Planning in Developing Countries* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1981), pp. 64-69.

³⁵Bryan Roberts, *Cities of Peasants: The Political Economy of Urbanization in the Third World* (London: Edward Arnold, 1978), p. 177.

³⁶Perhaps an extreme example of this was Le Corbusier's plan for the city of Chandigarh in India. See Madhu Sarin, "Human Settlements and the Social Organization of Production," *The Impact of Science on Society*, Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (April-June 1977), pp. 197-207.

³⁷See, for example, Robyn Lim, "The Philippines and the 'Dependency' Debate: A Preliminary Case Study," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (1978), pp.

196-209; Jeff Frieden, "Third World Indebted Industrialization: International Finance and State Capitalism in Mexico, Brazil, Algeria and South Korea," *International Organization*, Vol. XXXV, No. 3 (Summer 1981), pp. 407-431; Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye, *The New International Division of Labour: Structural Unemployment in Industrialised Countries and Industrialisation in Developing Countries*, Trans. Pete Burgess (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

³⁸See, for example, Eduardo C. Tadem, "Peasant Land Rights and the Philippine Corporate Farming Program," *Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review*, Vol. XLII, Nos. 1-4 (January-December 1978), pp. 56-76; Ho Kwon Ping, "Profits and Poverty in the Plantation," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. CIX, No. 29 (11 July 1980), pp. 53-57; Ponciano L. Bennagen, "Philippine Cultural Minorities: Victims as Victors," in Vivencio R. Jose, ed., *Mortgaging the Future: The World Bank and IMF in the Philippines* (Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1983), pp. 161-168; Luzon Secretariat for Social Action, "Plantation Agriculture: Imperialists' Boon . . . Peasants' Doom," *Diliman Review*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January-February 1984), pp. 24-27; Jaime K. Laking, "Palm Oil Flows with Blood in the Land of Promise," *Diliman Review*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (March-April 1984), pp. 10-14.

³⁹See, for example, "Realism Replaces Ambition; Manila Reconsiders Its Lagging Industrial Programme," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. CXIV, No. 48 (20 November 1981), pp. 54-55.

⁴⁰Undoubtedly, the BERI report on the Philippines which had come out earlier at the beginning of 1983, also contributed a lot to the loss of confidence by foreign investors, hence the massive capital flight. See Alex Magno, "The BERI Report: What Do The Corporate Soothsayers Say?" *WHO*, Vol. V, No. 28 (12 October 1983), pp. 17-19.

⁴¹See, for example, Ma. Teresa Diokno, "The IMF and How It Affects the Filipino People," (Quezon City: Third World Studies Center, September 1983), also in *U.P. Newsletter*, Vol. VIII, No. 5 (6 February 1984), pp. 4-5 and Vol. VIII, No. 6 (13 February 1984), pp. 4-5; Alex Magno, "The Financial Crisis: An Economy Bound for Hell?," *WHO*, Vol. V, No. 32 (9 November 1983), pp. 8-11; Leonor M. Briones, "The Debt Burden of the Philippines: Magnitudes, Costs and Problems," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXVII, No. 4 (October 1983), pp. 353-371; Dante Canlas *et al.*, "The Philippine Economic Crisis: Causes and Alternatives," U.P. School of Economics Workshop Report, June 1984; Alejandro Lichauco, "Review of UP Report on the Economic Crisis: Disturbing Proposals in an Incoherent Paper," *Philippine Panorama*, Vol. XIII, No. 34 (26 August 1984), pp. 5, 46, 50; Hilario M. Henares, Jr., "White Paper Whodunit: The Villain is the Hero," *Bulletin Today*, 7 November 1984, pp. 7-15 and 9 November 1984 p. 7.

⁴²See, for example, Renato Constantino, *The Nationalist Alternative* (Rev. ed.; Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1984); Augusto Caesar Espiritu, "Shaping Our Own Future; Blueprint for a New Development Strategy," *Philippine Panorama*, Vol. XIII, No. 22 (3 June 1984), pp. 5, 45, 46-48; Bayani Santos, Jr., "Interview with Renato Constantino: Will the Nationalist Alternative Work?" *WHO*, Vol. VI, No. 16 (18 July 1984), pp. 20-22; Hilarion M. Henares, Jr., "History Repeats Itself and No One Listens," *Bulletin Today*, 22 September 1984, pp. 7, 9 and 24 September 1984, p. 7.

⁴³Republic of the Philippines, National Economic and Development Authority, *1981 Philippine Statistical Yearbook* (Manila: 1981), pp. 112-113, 135; *1982 Philippine Statistical Yearbook*, pp. 104-105.

⁴⁴Data are from the National Economic and Development Authority, Central Bank of the Philippines and other sources compiled in *IBON Facts and Figures*, No. 142 (15 July 1984), Table 8, p. 8.

⁴⁵Central Bank of the Philippines, *Twenty-Eighth Annual Report, 1976 to Thirty-Third Annual Report, 1981* (Manila: 1976-1982).

⁴⁶Central Bank of the Philippines cited in *IBON Facts and Figures*, *op. cit.*

⁴⁷See Sheila Ocampo, "Philippines: Come Out of the Jungle," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. CXIV, No. 46 (6 November 1981), pp. 14, 23; "Dissidence and Detente," in *ibid.*, pp. 23-24; "Use Words, Not Bullets," *ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

⁴⁸In the case of shelter, it appears that social class and inequality in public housing allocation persist even in socialist states. See Ivan Szelenyi, "Class Analysis and Beyond: Further Dilemmas for the New Urban Sociology," *Comparative Urban Research*, Vol. VI, Nos. 2-3 (1978), pp. 86-96.